

The Meanings of Democracy

Nicholas T. Davis
University of Alabama

Kirby Goidel
Texas A&M University

Yikai Zhao
Texas A&M University

(Abstract)

While recent research has noted declining public support for democracy and coinciding growth in support for populist right wing political parties, it has implicitly assumed a shared understanding of democracy across time and space. In this paper, we utilize multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) and latent profile analysis (LPA) to identify the structure of public understandings of democracy as revealed through the “essential characteristics of democracy” on the World Values Survey (WVS). We find, first, that only the procedural items used in the “essential characteristics of democracy” battery are roughly equivalent cross-nationally, and even here they achieve metric but not scalar invariance. Second, we find that public understandings of democracy differ from one country to the next. In most countries, the data are best represented by three classes (or clusters) while in other countries the data are better represented by two profiles. Even when the number of profiles is the same, the pattern of findings is often different to suggest different underlying understandings of democracy across contexts.

THE MEANINGS OF DEMOCRACY

Perhaps no question has animated contemporary political science more than how (and whether) citizens understand democracy. By definition, democracy is based on some form of “consent of the governed” but what form or shape that consent takes remains ambiguous and contested. Are “minimalist” definitions emphasizing voting, majority rule, and competitive elections adequate? Or must democracy protect individual rights against the “tyranny of the majority”? And, what responsibility do democracies have for providing citizens with basic necessities or addressing social, economic, and political inequalities?

In contemporary politics, the rise of right-wing populism has infused these questions with renewed urgency. Has dissatisfaction with democracy led to “backsliding” in support for democratic processes and institutions and to an openness to autocratic rulers who claim democratic legitimacy (Canache 2012, Mounk 2018)?¹ Have long established democracies lost what David Easton (1975) referred to as “diffuse support,” the underlying support necessary to sustain a political system and that transcends the “specific support” for elected governments and leaders (Easton 1975)?

Where liberal democracy was once described as the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992), other forms of government have emerged as seemingly attractive alternatives. Many of these governments initially formed through democratic elections but quickly transformed by expanding executive authority, limiting political opposition, and undermining democratic political processes and institutions (Diamond 2008). Perhaps even worse, they also undermined longstanding democratic norms (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Within this context, gauging the public’s understanding of democracy looms as a critical and practical concern. What, after all, does democratic backsliding mean if we do not first answer the question of backsliding from what? What understanding did the public begin with?

In our previous work, we attempted to answer this question narrowly within the American context (Davis, et al., 2018, 2019). Using latent class analysis, we found that the public lacks a singular shared understanding of democracy and instead operates under multiple, often competing, understandings. The meaning of democracy, even within this context, is not shared. Two of the more common understandings, an expansive social democratic conceptualization that includes support for economic equality and a libertarian understanding that holds a procedural view of democracy, were strongly correlated with abstract support for democratic governance. For these groups, we argued, dissatisfaction with democracy reflected more on their perceptions of democratic performance than on their abstract support for democratic principles.

In this paper, we expand that work to consider democratic understandings across cultural contexts. Specifically, we ask two related questions: To what extent are our measures of democratic understanding invariant (or equivalent) cross-nationally? Do individuals in different countries share a common understanding of the survey items designed to gauge public understanding of democratic processes and institutions? Second, to what extent do individuals share a common understanding of democracy across cultural contexts? Do individuals in the United Kingdom think about the democracy in the same way as individuals in the United States or Sweden or Japan? To answer the first set of questions, we utilize multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MG-CFA) to consider the measurement properties of the “essential characteristics of democracy” items included on the World Values Survey. To answer the second set of question, we use latent profile analysis to test whether citizens sort into similar categories of understanding across these very different cultural and national contexts.

We find, first, that while the procedural items hold together reasonably well across contexts, the substantive items—focused on redistribution of wealth and taxation—do not. Items gauging respondent support for free elections, equal rights for women, religious separation from state, and civil liberties achieve metric invariance, meaning that the factor loadings are similar across countries. They do not, however, achieve scalar invariance, meaning that we should exercise caution when comparing means

¹ One study in Venezuela found that the transformations under Chavez had little effect on citizens’ understanding or support for democracy (Canache 2012).

across countries. Second, we find that understandings of democracy differ from one country to the next. In some countries, the data are best represented three classes (or clusters) while in other countries the data are better represented by three classes. In one country (Serbia), a four class solution emerges. Even when the number of profiles is the same, the pattern of findings is often different enough to suggest unique understandings of democracy across contexts.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Comparative politics scholars have long sought to understand how people understand democracy and how those understandings differ across contexts (Diamond and Plattner 2008). Examining meanings of democracy in “unlikely places,” Dalton, Shin, & Jou (2007) argue that a liberal understanding of democracy has been widely diffused and is strongly associated with political freedom and civil rights (Dalton, et al. 2007). When asked to define democracy in an open-ended format, individuals throughout the world—even in nondemocratic countries—define it first and foremost in terms of freedom. Procedural democracy (majority rule, free and fair elections) and social benefits (economic equality) are mentioned less often. Democratic understandings, they contend, are also learned over time. As countries transition to democracy, definitions evolve from process and institutions based definitions to civil liberties and political freedom.

Yet, other research suggests that abstract support for democracy does not neatly translate into support for specific democratic process, institutions, or norms. Examining this literature, Bratton (2010) concludes that “I doubt whether global comparisons about the quality of democracy, at least as judged by citizens themselves, can be justified at all” (Bratton 2010). His concern is that while individuals might well associate democracy with political freedom at an abstract level, their understanding of political freedom may also be heavily contingent upon cultural and context. Definitions of democracy may share terms (political freedom) but not common understandings of what those terms mean.

The difference here is partly methodological. Dalton, Shin, & Jou (2007) allow respondents to define democracy in response to an open-ended prompt. While this gives survey respondents more of an opportunity to define democracy in their own words, the words used may have unique cultural meanings. Instead, Bratton (2010) argues for more specific questions and for vignettes that can “anchor” respondent understandings of democracy, a solution suggested by King (2004) to improve the comparability of cross-national survey research. Bratton is subsequently less convinced that there is shared public understanding of democracy. Indeed, based on previous research, we would expect public understandings of democracy to align along either two (procedural and substantive) or three (procedural, liberties, and social benefit) dimensions (Baviskar and Malone 2004, Bratton, et al. 2005, Dalton, et al. 2007, Crow 2010).

In this paper, we propose a slightly different approach for delineating the public’s understanding of democracy. In previous research, we utilized a module of the Congressional Cooperative Election Study and latent class analysis to examine the public’s understanding of democracy within the U.S. context. We found that, at least in the U.S. case, understandings of democracy aligned into five unique classes: (1) a social democratic group that held an expansive view of democracy; (2) a libertarian group that viewed democracy largely as process and individual rights; (3) a neoliberal group that was fell in between the libertarian and social democratic views; and two smaller groups (indifferent and critical) who either held neutral or negative views toward various characteristics of democracy. This research suggested greater difference than commonality in how people viewed democracy. Here, we utilize the World Values Survey to expand this approach to a comparative context. Doing so raises important substantive questions. If individuals largely share a common understanding (or understandings) of democracy, the pattern of findings should be similar across countries. If the pattern of findings is not similar across countries, we have strong evidence that understandings of democracy are culturally dependent. This leads to our central research questions:

- RQ1: Do individuals across cultural contexts share an understanding of survey questions designed to gauge public understanding of the “essential characteristics of democracy”?

- RQ2: Are collective understanding of democracy shared cross-nationally?

METHODS AND DATA

For evidence, we utilize the “essential characteristics of democracy” questions from Wave 5 (2005-2009) of the World Values Survey (WVS). We utilize Wave 5 as a starting point for the analysis with the idea of adding waves to subsequent analyses to consider whether the patterns that emerge are consistent over time (as well as across space). We limit the analysis to countries that score a 6 or above on the Polity Index gauging democracy and that represent a range of regions, cultures, and political systems. This includes the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.² We utilize Wave 5 rather than Wave 6 both because of the availability and range of countries available for analysis and as a first step in the research. Moving forward, one of the research questions left to future inquiry is whether the patterns reported below hold up over time.

We use the essential characteristics of democracy questions because of their specificity—they ask respondents to evaluate institutional features of democratic governance—and because they associate particular characteristics of democracy (free elections, civil liberties) to core democracy’s definition. The specific question wording from the World Values Survey is as follows:

Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means ‘not at all an essential characteristic of democracy’ and 10 means it definitely is ‘an essential characteristic of democracy.’

For this analysis, we include the following individual items: (1) Government taxes rich to subsidize poor; (2) Religious authorities interpret laws; (3) People choose leaders in free elections; (4) People receive state aid for employment; (5) Civil rights protect people’s liberties from state oppression; (6) Women have the same rights as men.³ We would note that these items have been widely used in the existing literature often in a comparative context (Norris 2011, Welzel 2011, Shin 2012, De Regt 2013, Ariely 2015).

As an analytic strategy, we first employ multi-group confirmatory factor analysis to examine the equivalence (or invariance) of these items across contexts. One of the central challenges of survey research is asking questions in way that is comparable across social, political, and cultural contexts (Ariely and Davidov 2011, Davidov, et al. 2014, Ippel, et al. 2014, Alemán and Woods 2016). Differences across contexts may reflect different understandings of the latent construct being measured (construct bias), differences in survey methods across countries (methods bias), or differences in individual items (item bias) (Byrne and Watkins 2003, Davidov, et al. 2014). The larger underlying question, however, remains the same: Can we make meaningful comparisons across contexts? For this research can be more specifically stated: Can we make meaningful comparisons of the public understandings of democracy cross-nationally?

Given the multiplicity of meanings assigned to democracy, questions of measurement invariance are critical to studies of democratic attitudes (Canache, et al. 2001, Ariely and Davidov 2011, Canache 2012a, Ariely 2015). This is not a new point. Ariely and Davidov (2011) tested the cross-cultural equivalence of the “democratic-autocracy preference” scale and the “democratic performance evolution” scale across 36 countries. They found that, while the scales are comparable across countries, not all of the items are

² We also did not include Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Cyprus, Moldova, Mali, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Taiwan, New Zealand.

³ We did not include several of the items included as essential characteristics including: (1) Army takes over when government is incompetent; (2) The economy is prospering; (3) Criminals are severely punished; (4) People can change the laws in referendums. In a previous study, Ariely (2015) found that only the procedural items (noted below) loaded together as a single factor in a measurement model.

equivalent nor is the scale comparable across all countries. More Ariely (2015) ran a MGCFA and found a procedural understanding of democracy—four of the essential characteristics of democracy achieved partial metric invariance.⁴

Tests of measurement invariance do not provide a straightforward either/or proposition as there at least four levels of invariance (Van de Schoot, Lugtig, and Hox, 2012). We describe each of these below.

- Configural invariance indicates whether a latent variable is a function of the same set of observed variables across context. If so, this suggests that the structure behind the latent variable is the same across countries.
- Metric invariance indicates whether or not the factor loadings on the latent variable are the same across countries (Kim et al., 2017). Satisfying metric invariance indicates that the unit and the interval of the latent variable are roughly equivalent cross-nationally. Perhaps stated differently, metric invariance tells us whether a one unit increase on the democracy scale in one country (e.g., United States) is equivalent to a one unit increase in another country (e.g., United Kingdom, Japan, or Sweden).
- Scalar invariance evaluates the intercepts of each item variable across groups. Achieving scalar invariance allows comparisons of mean values across countries. Failure to satisfy scalar invariance means that countries tend to systematically give higher or lower item responses. Concerns about scalar invariance can be addressed by King et. al.'s (2004) suggestion to anchor scale ratings with vignettes.
- Strict invariance investigates if residual variances are consistent across groups *after satisfying the assumptions of metric and scalar invariance*. Strict invariance provides evidence that the mean differences across groups are driven by real group differences and not by error. While strict invariance is the ideal, the requirements are generally too difficult to meet in practice (Davidov et al., 2008; Jang et al., 2017; Meredith, 1993).

Despite its importance to comparative research, tests for measurement equivalence remain relatively rare in political science (but see Reeskens and Hooghe 2008, Ariely and Davidov 2011, Davidov and Coromina 2013, Freitag and Bauer 2013, Davidov, et al. 2014, Ippel, et al. 2014, Marien 2017, Zhao 2019).

Most often, tests for measurement invariance use multi-group confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate whether or not individual items are measuring the same latent construct cross-nationally. At least initially, this is the approach used in the current paper. As our second analytic task, however, we conduct latent profile analysis. Latent profile analysis, which places respondents into classes (or clusters) based on their response patterns, has also been used to test measurement equivalence (Davidov, et al. 2014). If the underlying constructs are roughly equivalent, the same set of classes should emerge across countries.

In latent profile analysis, the number of classes is determined by the expectation-maximization algorithm which involves an iterative process until the model converges on a best fit for the data. The idea is that there should be shared variance within the clusters and that clusters should be empirically distinct from each other (Olivera-Aguilar and Rikoon 2018). As with latent profile analysis, model fit is selected using goodness of fit measures, most commonly Bayesian Information Criteria (Oberski 2016). This is the approach we adopt here, though we acknowledge that model selection should also consider interpretability and local independence.

Within political science, latent profile analysis has been used to develop media use profiles in Netherlands (Bos, et al. 2016) and profiles undecided voters (“fence sitters”) in New Zealand (Greaves, et al. 2015). Latent class analysis has been used to identify classes of democratic participants (Oser, et al. 2013), understandings of democratic citizenship (Hooghe, et al. 2016), and even public understandings of democracy (Hooghe, et al. 2017, Oser and Hooghe 2018). In our previous work, we used latent class


⁴ We perform a similar test but include additional substantive measures and limit the analysis to countries scoring 6 or above

analysis as well. Latent profile analysis, however, is better choice given the relatively large number of categories (1-10) and the skewed distribution of the variables. In existing latent class analyses (including our own), researchers have necessarily collapsed scale into three categories for model convergence. Decisions about how best to reduce these scale to improve modeling of the data, however, are necessarily problematic.⁵ Latent profile analysis instead allows us to use the full range of data to determine the number of classes.⁶ To conduct the analysis, we used the "poLCA" package in R. "poLCA" is one of the most used R packages (Linzer and Lewis 2011).

RESULTS

Before we analyze the results, we begin by first noting the distribution of the individual items. Because of the number of variables and the number of countries, we focus on a limited set of countries and a limited number of variables to provide a sense of the range of individual responses and the differences in those responses across countries. Figure 1 & 2 present the distribution of the responses to one of the procedural items and to one of the substantive items as raincloud plots for Brazil, Japan, Serbia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The point here is relatively straightforward. There is significant variance across these individual items and across different countries.


Figure 1: Distribution of Civil Rights Protect People’s Liberties from State Oppression across Select Countries



⁵ In our work, we recoded the responses using 0-4, 5, and 6-10 to create our categories. While this is intuitively appealing the data are skewed toward the upper end of the scale. Hooghe et. al. (2017), in contrast, recoded the data into three categories using 0-7, 8-9, and 10 as their cut-points.

⁶ Difference between latent profile analysis and latent class analysis are blurring and they have been used in a mixed way. The main reason we called it latent profile analysis is that we use 10-point scales instead of binary or trichotomous scales which is usually the case for LCA. In addition, we use profile plots to plot the means for the individual question items to aid our interpretation of the findings. In contrast, in LCA researchers traditionally plot binary probabilities. Strictly speaking LPA should be based on a continuous distribution.

Figure 2: Distribution of Government Taxes Research to Subsidize Poor across a Select Counties



In Table 1, we present the results of the MGCFA. For the purposes of this analysis, model fit is interpreted based on three indices: chi-square, comparative fit index (CFI), and root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA). Because chi-square values are sensitive to sample size and the number of groups included in the analysis (Bentler and Bonett, 1980; Jang et al., 2017), we primarily rely on CFI and RMSEA. By convention, $CFI \geq 0.95$ and the $RMSEA \leq 0.05$ indicate acceptable model fits (Hu and Bentler, 1999). Within the MGCFA context, however, previous research advocates for a more liberal RMSEA cutoff ≤ 0.10 based on simulation results showing the number of groups included affects the RMSEA cutoff (Rutkowski and Svetina, 2014).

To begin, we conducted an MGCFA with all six of the essential characteristics of democracy and all twenty two countries. This resulted in a poorly fitted model. Subsequently, we divided countries into western democracies (Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States) and the rest of the world. Because western countries are more homogenous, it may be that the essential characteristics of democracy have similar meanings among these countries. The model fit, however, is not satisfying for either metric or scalar invariance. In addition, the model fits do not indicate measure equivalence for the rest of the world.


As a third step, we focused the analysis on the four essential characteristics of democracy that best capture a procedural understanding of democracy (Ariely 2015) leaving out the variables that reflected a more substantive understanding. Focusing specifically on these procedural variables, we find that the models fit reasonably well when it comes to achieving metric invariance for both western countries and the rest of the world. Neither model, however, achieves scalar invariance. So practically speaking, what does this mean? First, achieving metric invariance means the intervals on the latent construct are roughly equal. Second, however, failing to achieve scalar invariance means that we should be cautious interpreting means from these measures and comparing levels of democratic support across contexts. Consistent with King (2004), the democracy scale that emerges needs to be anchored to assure that public understanding of democracy is consistent across cultural, political, and economic contexts.

Table 1: Metric Invariance of Democracy Variables

		Western countries	Rest of world
All six variables (Subsidize poor; Religious authorities; Free elections; State aid; Civil liberties; Women’s rights)	Metric Invariance	$\chi^2 = 2291.20$ df = 121 CFI = 0.77 RMSEA = 0.13	$\chi^2 = 2506.50$ df = 177 CFI = 0.81 RMSEA = 0.12
	Scalar Invariance	$\chi^2 = 4058.80$ df = 161 CFI = 0.59 RMSEA = 0.15	$\chi^2 = 5532.20$ df = 237 CFI = 0.58 RMSEA = 0.15
Procedural Variables (Religious authorities; Free elections; Civil liberties; Women’s rights)	Metric Invariance	$\chi^2 = 390.25$ df = 42 CFI = 0.95 RMSEA = 0.08	$\chi^2 = 258.00$ df = 62 CFI = 0.97 RMSEA = 0.06
	Scalar Invariance	$\chi^2 = 1158.38$ df = 66 CFI = 0.83 RMSEA = 0.12	$\chi^2 = 1095.62$ df = 98 CFI = 0.81 RMSEA = 0.12

To conduct the latent profile analysis, we begin by include all 22 countries included in the analysis. The results are displayed in Figure 2. What should be immediately apparent is the number and diversity of classes that emerge from the analysis. Without considering the interpretability or the overlap of the individual classes, there are 11 unique understandings of democracy across these 22 countries. Notably, Public understandings of democracy, it would seem, need to be understand at the country level.

Figure 2: Latent Profile Analysis of All Countries



If an 11-class solution emerges from the data when pooling all of the countries together, then what is the distribution of classes *within* countries? Although past research has argued that a single, uniform model can be utilized to speak to democratic meanings (e.g. Oser and Hooghe 2018), our earlier test of measurement invariance calls into question the appropriateness of pooling the data cross-nationally. Instead, we ought to fit models to each of the countries individually.


Figure 3 presents an overview of the finding by displaying the country and the number of clusters as determined by the model. Recall that model selection here is based solely on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). As Figure 2 reveals, a 3-class model is suggested for most countries with more than a few exceptions. For example, Sweden, Argentina, Japan, Poland, and Romania yield a 2-class solution. In addition, the model produces a 4-class solution for Serbia.



Notably, a two or three class solution is what we might expect given existing literature. Previous research into public understandings of democracy has found either two classes of understanding (procedural and substantive) or three class of understanding (procedural, civil liberties, and substantive). To understand the patterns of response, we first considered a 3-D plot of the item response probabilities for different classes (a multinomial distribution for each class) within each country. From the 3-D plot, we could directly visualize the probability of each answer for an individual survey item within a class (e.g., the probability for a

class 1 person answer a "10" in question 1).⁷ For readability and interpretability in presenting the findings, however, we created a profile plot each country, which displays the estimated class means for each question. In Figure 4, we present the profile plots for the six of the countries that we presented distributions on in the raincloud plots (see Figure 1).

Figure 4: Profile Plots of Classes Derived from Latent Profile Analysis



Looking at the patterns across these of selection of countries, the discrepancies across should be apparent. The three classes that emerge in the United States look very different from the three classes that emerge in the United Kingdom or Brazil. Second, in some countries, the classes that emerge as distinct look to have only minor differences. In Sweden, for example, the two classes are only barely distinguishable with largest difference on issues related to civil liberties. Similarly, in the United Kingdom differences between the two classes noted by the red and green line appear marginal. Third, across these countries, the patterns do bear some resemblance. We need to be careful not to overstate the uniqueness of these different perspectives. While they are statistically identified they may be substantively similar. Connecting this to the findings on measurement invariance, the differences may be less in the relationships across variables and more in the tendency within some countries to rate more (or less) essential. The pattern of findings in Sweden and Japan, for example, look similar but gaps between the two groups much larger on questions relating to free elections,

⁷ Interested readers can see the 3-D visualizations at the following link; https://yikai-zhao.shinyapps.io/shiny_app/

state aid for the unemployed, civil liberties, and women's rights. Fourth, in countries with three classes the third group is often less supportive of democracy across a range of issues. In Serbia, the only country with four classes, the two additional classes are less supportive of democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

The question we attempt to address in this paper is not particularly new. Scholars have long considered how the public thinks about democracy. Previous research has also given considerable attention to whether these definitions are comparable. Our contribution is to think about these questions in the context of set of specific measurement techniques, MGCFA and latent profile analysis. This is not just methodological doodling as the techniques raise a critical substantive question: To what extent are public understandings of democracy comparable cross-nationally? The results should give us some pause in how we approach these questions.

First, our analysis of the measurement equivalence of the essential characteristics of democracy is consistent with Ariely (2015) conclusion that procedural items achieve the requirements of partial metric invariance. Our findings are similar. At least in the democratic countries under consideration, these countries meet the requirements of metric invariance. They do not, however, meet the more rigorous standards for scalar invariance. Practically speaking, this means the measures are comparable across countries, they should take caution in making mean comparisons. In addition, when the substantive understandings of democracy are included in the models, we do not achieve metric or scalar invariance. Procedural and substantive understandings of democracy are conceptually distinct.

Second, our latent profile analysis indicates that there is no single shared understanding of democracy across countries or, for that matter, a set of shared understandings. Indeed, when we examine all countries, we end up with an eleven class solution. Looking at the countries sheds more light on this set of findings. In most of the countries included in the analysis, a three class solution provides the best fit to the data. In small subset set of countries, a two class solution provides a better fit to the data. Notably, the patterns across countries are similar, though not identical. This is why looking at the countries collective, we find an eleven class solution.

Our overall conclusion is that we need to pay closer attention to how people think about democracy within a particular context. While they are roughly comparable, there are important differences across countries. We suspect these differences reflect structural differences in party systems, competition, and political ideology. Unfortunately we have to leave these questions to future research. We are also curious as to how well the patterns hold up over time and whether we would see the underlying shift with the rise of right wing populist candidates and parties. This too is something we will have to investigate in the future.

Finally, we should note some of the limitations with this research. First, we used Bayesian Information Criterion to choose the best model for each country. Pragmatically, this worked well because the BIC largely agreed with our theoretical expectations of two to three classes. The decision on the number of classes to include, however, should be driven by substantive and ease of interpretation as well as statistical criteria or ease of interpretation (Oberski, 2016). In countries where two classes are closely related, it may make sense to reduce the number of classes. Second, one of assumptions of LCA is local independence, meaning that observed items are conditionally independent of each other given that an individual belongs to a certain latent class. The models we have included provided the best according to the BIC but may not provide the model with the most local independence. In practice, the best model is usually a compromise among the information criteria, interpretability and the assessment of local independence (Porcu and Giambona 2017; Oberski, 2016).

WORKS CITED

- Alemán, José, and Dwayne Woods. 2016. "Value Orientations from the World Values Survey: How Comparable Are They Cross-Nationally?". *Comparative Political Studies* 49: 1039-67.
- Ariely, Gal. 2015. "Democracy-Assessment in Cross-National Surveys: A Critical Examination of How People Evaluate Their Regime." *Social Indicators Research* 121: 621-35.
- Ariely, Gal, and Eldad Davidov. 2011. "Can We Rate Public Support for Democracy in a Comparable Way? Cross-National Equivalence of Democratic Attitudes in the World Value Survey." *Social Indicators Research* 104: 271-86.
- Baviskar, Siddhartha, and Mary Fran Malone. 2004. "What Democracy Means to Citizens—and Why It Matters." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*.
- Bos, Linda, Sanne Kruike-meier, and Claes de Vreese. 2016. "Nation Binding: How Public Service Broadcasting Mitigates Political Selective Exposure." *PloS one* 11: e0155112.
- Bratton, Michael. 2010. "Anchoring the "D-Word" in Africa." *Journal of Democracy* 21: 106-13.
- Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi. 2005. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*: Cambridge University Press.
- Byrne, Barbara M, and David Watkins. 2003. "The Issue of Measurement Invariance Revisited." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 34: 155-75.
- Canache, Damarys. 2012. "The Meanings of Democracy in Venezuela: Citizen Perceptions and Structural Change." *Latin American Politics and Society* 54: 95-122.
- Crow, David. 2010. "The Party's Over: Citizen Conceptions of Democracy and Political Dissatisfaction in Mexico." *Comparative Politics* 43: 41-61.
- Dalton, Russell J, To-ch'öl Sin, and Willy Jou. 2007. "Understanding Democracy: Data from Unlikely Places." *Journal of Democracy* 18: 142-56.
- Davidov, Eldad, Bart Meuleman, Jan Cieciuch, Peter Schmidt, and Jaak Billiet. 2014. "Measurement Equivalence in Cross-National Research." *Annual review of sociology* 40: 55-75.
- Davis, Nicholas T., Kirby Goidel, and Keith Gaddie. 2018. "Democracy's About Tradeoffs: How Individuals Think About the Meanings of Democracy." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.
- . 2019. "How Democratic Meanings Shape Political Compromise." Paper presented at the Southern Political Science Association.
- . "The Link between the Meanings of and Support for Democracy."
- De Regt, Sabrina. 2013. "Arabs Want Democracy, but What Kind?". *Advances in Applied Sociology* 3: 37.
- Diamond, Larry. 2008. "The Democratic Rollback-the Resurgence of the Predatory State." *Foreign Aff.* 87: 36.
- Diamond, Larry Jay, and Marc F. Plattner. 2008. *How People View Democracy*, A Journal of Democracy Book. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5: 435-57.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York
Toronto: Free Press ;
Maxwell Macmillan Canada ;
Maxwell Macmillan International.
- Greaves, Lara M, Danny Osborne, and Chris G Sibley. 2015. "Profiling the Fence-Sitters in New Zealand Elections: A Latent Profile Model of Political Voting Blocs." *New Zealand Journal of Psychology (Online)* 44: 43.

- Hooghe, Marc, Sofie Marien, and Jennifer Oser. 2017. "Great Expectations: The Effect of Democratic Ideals on Political Trust in European Democracies." *Contemporary Politics* 23: 214-30.
- Hooghe, Marc, Jennifer Oser, and Sofie Marien. 2016. "A Comparative Analysis of 'Good Citizenship': A Latent Class Analysis of Adolescents' Citizenship Norms in 38 Countries." *International Political Science Review* 37: 115-29.
- Ippel, Lianne, John PTM Gelissen, and Guy BD Moors. 2014. "Investigating Longitudinal and Cross Cultural Measurement Invariance of Inglehart's Short Post-Materialism Scale." *Social Indicators Research* 115: 919-32.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. *How Democracies Die*. First edition. ed. New York: Crown.
- Linzer, Drew A, and Jeffrey B Lewis. 2011. "Polca: An R Package for Polytomous Variable Latent Class Analysis." *Journal of statistical software* 42: 1-29.
- Mounk, Yascha. 2018. *The People Vs. Democracy : Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It*. Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England: Harvard University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 2011. *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited*: Cambridge University Press.
- Oberski, Daniel. 2016. "Mixture Models: Latent Profile and Latent Class Analysis." In *Modern Statistical Methods for Hci*: Springer. 275-87.
- Olivera-Aguilar, Margarita, and Samuel H. Rikoon. 2018. "Assessing Measurement Invariance in Multiple-Group Latent Profile Analysis." *Structural equation modeling: a multidisciplinary journal* 25: 439-52.
- Oser, Jennifer, and Marc Hooghe. 2018. "Democratic Ideals and Levels of Political Participation: The Role of Political and Social Conceptualisations of Democracy." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20: 711-30.
- Oser, Jennifer, Marc Hooghe, and Sofie Marien. 2013. "Is Online Participation Distinct from Offline Participation? A Latent Class Analysis of Participation Types and Their Stratification." *Political Research Quarterly* 66: 91-101.
- Porcu, Mariano, and Francesca Giambona. 2017. "Introduction to Latent Class Analysis with Applications." *The Journal of Early Adolescence* 37: 129-58.
- Shin, D. 2012. "Is Democracy Emerging as a Universal Value? A Contrarian Perspective." In *Secondary Is Democracy Emerging as a Universal Value? A Contrarian Perspective*, ed Secondary ——. Reprint, Reprint.
- Welzel, Christian. 2011. "The Asian Values Thesis Revisited: Evidence from the World Values Surveys." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 12: 1-31.